





























 NICOLE HODGE AMEY (SBN 215157) 
THE LAW OFFICES OF NICOLE HODGE AMEY 
P.O. Box 5100 
Oakland, California  94605 
Telephone:  (510) 479-0003 
Facsimile:  (866) 602-2986  
Email:  nicole.amey@lonhaca.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
      INTRODUCTION  
1. Plaintiff M.K. is a child who is a California elementary public school student, who attended school 
via Google classrooms during school closures beginning on or about March 16, 2020.     
2. More than a year ago due to concerns over the then unknown COVID-19, Fremont Unified School 
District shuttered its schools’ doors.  
3.  Google offered its platform as a solution to the closure of schools and public school students 
transitioned to Google’s online and internet based systems to access their education. Parents were 
not given an option to opt out or an alternative to receive education if they did not wish to risk their 
child’s privacy. 
4. Once MK’s parent learned of the risks of Google classroom and didn’t participate in the program, 
MK was not given any options to receive classroom instruction. 
M.K., a minor by and through his guardian ad 
litems Brian and Melanie Kirksey, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOOGLE, LLC. and FREMONT UNIFIED 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
                         Defendants.
Case No.:   
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF and  
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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5. Over the years Google has marketed its school products as a free educational tool, and it has hidden 
the real cost of its product is privacy, data collection, stalking by predators and risk of pornographic 
material and targeting of children by predators while participating on the Google platform. 
6. Without notice to parents Google has collected troves of personal information, including: 
        M.K.’s physical locations, websites visited, every search term used in Google’s search engine and   
        links clicked on, the videos watched, voice recordings,  saved passwords, biometrics and other    
         behavioral  information. 
7. Upon information and belief Plaintiff contends that MK’s device was hacked in January 2021 and 
the hacker sent sexually explicit content to MK’s classroom teacher.  Google and Fremont Unified 
School District failed to inform teachers, school staff and parents of the risk of stalking or hacking 
into the classroom. In M.K.’s situation the content the hacker sent, was linked to M.K. and he was 
punished for the content and exposed to the content. 
8.  Upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts Google will log the hacker’s explicit conduct as 
conduct of MK.  MK has no means of clearing his reputation and ensuring that data associated with 
him and is his data. Parents did not consent to the collection of data, and now have no means to 
protect the reputation of MK from the sexually explicit content that is now linked to his Google 
classroom account.  Plaintiff has no information or control of who Google distributes its data 
collection to and seeks to protect the reputation and privacy of MK within this action.    
9.  In 1999, to better protect the privacy of children under the age of 13, the United States Congress 
enacted Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506, in 
response to a growing concern over the collection of children’s data on the Internet. In passing 
COPPA, Congress specifically sought to increase parental involvement in children’s online 
activities, ensure children’s safety during their participation in online activities, and most 
importantly, protect children’s personal information. Ultimately, Congress enacted COPPA with the 
specific goal of placing parents in control over what information is collected from their young 
children online. To that end, COPPA requires, in relevant part, that websites and online services 
fully and clearly disclose their data collection, use, and disclosure practices, and obtain “verifiable 
!  2
M.K. v. Google et al.  






























parental consent” before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 
13.  A violation of this regulation is deemed unlawful. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3. 
10. COPPA does not cover collection of biometric data and as such parent must proceed by private 
action to address the collection of biometric data.
11. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that Google did not provide the school with full 
notice of its collection, use, and disclosure practices in the same way that it is otherwise required to 
do for a parent and if Google did provide full notice, Defendant Fremont Unified failed to inform 
parent of what Google would collect and use and District failed to obtain parental consent.
12. Under COPPA, school districts are authorized to provide consent on behalf of parents and may 
approve a student’s use of an educational program. A Learning Education Agencies (“LEAs”) 
ability to consent on a parent’s behalf is strictly limited to the educational context. That is, an LEAs 
educational purposes and not for any commercial purpose. 
13. Under COPPA, an operator of a website or online service that collects personal information from 
children must provide notice to the child’s parent about its data collection practices and obtain 
verifiable parental consent prior to any collection or use of personal information from children. A 
violation of this regulation is deemed unlawful. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3. 
14. Plaintiff alleges Defendant District could not consent to Google’s collection of data as upon 
information and belief Parent contends Google did not enable the LEA to review and have deleted 
the personal information collected from its students.  Defendants did not inform parents that MK’s 
biometric data would be collected and stored and as COPPAA does not cover biometric data, the 
district could not consent to collection of that data.
15. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant District failed to determine and 
understand how an operator will collect, use, and disclose personal information from its students 
and it failed to understand how student’s would be protected from predators and hackers while in 
online classrooms and it failed to inform parents of the security risks.
16. Google capitalized on Covid school closures and used and its educational platform to collect MK’s 
personal and sensitive information for commercial purpose without notice to parents and it does not 
give parents of the Defendant district the ability to review, limit, or control data collected and used. 
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17.  California’s Student Online Personal Information Protection Act,(“SOPIPA”) (California Business 
and Professions Code section 22584) sets forth privacy laws for operators of websites, online 
services, and applications that are marketed and used for K-12 school purposes, even if those 
operators do not contract with educational agencies. 
18. SOPIPA requires operators to delete school- or district-controlled student information when 
requested by schools or districts.   
19. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges the District did not request Google to delete records 
or events associated to MK. 
20.  The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018; Civ. Code, § 1798.100 et seq., added by Stats. 
2018, ch. 55, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2020, grants any consumer, defined as “a natural person who is a 
California resident,” certain rights with respect to personal data collected by businesses. 
21. MK alleges Defendants deprived him or his parents of his rights with respect to his personal and 
biometric data, including notice of data collected and risk to personal information if hacked. 
22.  Children are particularly vulnerable from a negotiating perspective with respect to their privacy 
rights. Parents should be able to control what information is collected and California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018 or shared about their young children and should be given the right to demand 
that companies erase information collected about their children. 
23. Consumers should know who is collecting their personal information and that of their children, 
how it is being used, and to whom it is disclosed so that they have the information necessary to 
exercise meaningful control over businesses’ use of their personal information and that of their 
children. 
24.  Consumers should be able to control the use of their personal information, including limiting the 
use of their sensitive personal information, the unauthorized use or disclosure of which creates a 
heightened risk of harm to the consumer, and they should have meaningful options over how it is 
collected, used, and disclosed. 
25. MK used a school Chrome Book and Google classrooms which collects and stores biometric and 
other forms of personally identifying data, including videos watched and uses such information to  
!  4
M.K. v. Google et al.  






























for commercial purposes and to earn a profit. 
26. Defendant Google has collected, stored, and used or will use,  the biometrics and other personally 
identifying information of MK without having provided notice, obtaining informed parental 
consent, or publishing data retention policies. 
PARTIES 
27. This action is brought by MK a minor under 13 years old, residing in California and who attended 
Fremont Unified School District when issues complained of arose.    
28. SOPIPA, and California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 allow private actions to be filed for 
violations. 
29. Defendant Google LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Delaware, with its headquarters and principal place of business located in Mountain View 
California.  
30. Google is an “operator” as contemplated by 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 because it operates a “Web site 
located on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal information 
from or about the users of or visitors to such Web site or online service . . . where such Web site or 
online service is operated for commercial purposes involving commerce among the several States 
or with 1 or more foreign nations.” Indeed, students can access Google’s services online and 
Google provides its Google Education platform to schools in Illinois and throughout the country.  
31. Defendant Fremont Unified School District is a California Public Entity.  Student has complied 
with California’s Government Tort Claim Act prior to instituting this action, by providing written 
notice of the dispute on June 12, 2021. 
JURISDICTION and VENUE 
32. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1367. 
33.  Personal jurisdiction and venue are proper in California and within this District because Defendant 
maintains its corporate headquarters and principal place of business within this District, in 
Mountain View, California.  
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 
34. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.   
35. Google, LLC delivers pre-rcorded audio visual materials as described in 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) 
and is engaged in the business, or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or 
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio-visual materials delivering videos to 
consumers through its applications and platforms.  
36. As users of the App, Plaintiff is a consumers within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) of the 
VPPA. 
37. Defendant Google, LLC collected consumers personally identifiable information (“PII”)within 18 
U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). 
38. Defendant, upon information and belief, has disclosed PII to third-parties, including data brokers 
and advertisers, to generate revenue and profit.   
39. Defendants failed to solicit and/or obtain consent from Plaintiff and/or his parents to collect and 
disclose their PII, nor did Defendants provide clear and conspicuous notice of the disclosure of PII, 
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)(2)(B). 
40. The knowing disclosure and transmission of PII violates the VPPA within the meaning of 18 U.S.C 
§ 2710(b)(1). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION  
Violation of SOPIPA 
41. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.  
42. During the California school closures beginning on or about March 16, 2020, Google classrooms 
and platforms made itself available to California schools for the purpose of attending school online. 
43. Fremont Unified School District availed itself of the Google platform and required its students to 
attend class online to receive instruction, thus forcing students to submit to the privacy violations 
and data collection complained of. 
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44. Google had actual knowledge that its platforms were being used for educational purposes for 
students in Kindergarten through twelfth grades (“K-12”) and offered its platforms to Defendant 
district for purported educational purposes. 
45. SOPIPA prohibits an operator’s use of information, including persistent unique identifiers, created 
or gathered by the operators site, service, or application, to amass a profile about a K-12 student 
except in furtherance of K-12 school purposes. 
46. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief, Defendant Google has collected personal information 
including behavioral information and biometric data for purposes that do not further school 
purposes. 
47. Google failed to properly inform Plaintiff MK, his parents and/or his school, biometric identifiers” 
and “biometric information” were being “collected or stored” by Google.
48. SOPIPA requires service providers to implement reasonable security procedures and practices , yet 
Google failed to protect the children and classrooms as MK’s account was hacked, and his teacher 
received sexually inappropriate messages which were attributed to MK and the Defendant district 
refused to give MK a new account, when his parent requested a new student account.
49. MK alleges upon information and belief, Google’s data collection required student to maintain the 
same student account.
50. As alleged above MK has been harmed as the data collected will now link him to the behaviors of a 
hacker, and without complete knowledge of what Google intends to do with the data, MK risks 
being denied future opportunities because of what his Google behavioral data will show.  
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1-30 as if fully set forth herein.    
52. Google engaged in business acts and practices deemed “unlawful” under the UCL, because, as 
alleged above, Google unlawfully collected, stored, and used the biometric identifiers, biometric 
information, videos watched and other personally identifying information of Plaintiff without first 
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obtaining the requisite parental consent in violation of COPPA and Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) regulations.   
53. COPPA did not give the FTC authority to act when an operator collects biometric data or videos 
watched, however, Google did not obtain parental consent for such privacy intrusions.   
54. Fremont Unified School District gave Google access to its students, required students to participate 
and gave Google access to its student body, thus participating in the unlawful acts alleged against 
Google. 
55. Under COPPA, “personally identifiable information” includes information like names, email 
addresses, and social security numbers. COPPA’s definition of “personally identifiable 
information” are:     
“individually identifiable information about an individual collected online,” which 
includes (1) a first and last name; (2) a physical address including street name and name 
of a city or town; (3) online contact information (separately defined as “an email 
address or any other substantially similar identifier that permits direct contact with a 
person online”); (4) a screen name or user name; (5) telephone number; (6) social 
security number; (7) a media file containing a child’s image or voice; (8) geolocation 
information sufficient to identify street name and name of a city or town; (9) a 
“persistent identifier that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different 
Web sites or online services” (including but not limited to “a customer number held in a 
cookie, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a processor or device serial number, or unique 
device identifier”); and (10) any information concerning the child or the child’s parents 
that the operator collects then combines with an identifier. 
56. The FTC regards “persistent identifiers” as “personally identifiable” information that can be 
reasonably linked to a particular child. 
57. Plaintiff is a minor child who had his biometric identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other 
personally identifying information including his names and e-mail addresses collected, captured, 
received, or otherwise obtained by Google in connection with their use of Google’s education 
platforms.   
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58. Specifically, upon information and belief Google collected, chats by student, communications to 
teachers and peers, browsing histories,  contact lists, videos watched, and audio notes and memos 
of Plaintiff in the form of audio files containing the child’s voice and digitized images of the child’s 
facial geometry, as well as biometric identifiers and biometric information derived therefrom. 
Google attributed all data it collected from MK to his Google accounts with his name and unique 
identifiers.  
59. Pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 31 2.4(a), “[i]t shall be the obligation of the operator to provide notice and 
obtain verifiable parental consent prior to collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from 
children. Such notice must be clearly and understandably written, complete, and must contain no 
unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials.”   
60. Google failed to provide notice to Plaintiff’s parents, and has failed to provide such notice to the 
parents as required by 16 C.F.R. § 312.4.   
61. Due to Covid related school closures parent had no alternative to Google platforms as the school 
did not offer an alternative.  Parents and MK were forced to submit to Google’s data collection, 
even had notice been offered, as in person schools were shut down by the state of California.
62. Google and the District have failed to give parent guidance on the deletion of data connected to 
MK. 
63. Google has failed to provide direct notice to Plaintiff’s parents stating the types of personal 
information it seeks to collect from the child.  
64. Google failed to obtain—or even adequately attempt to obtain—parental consent authorizing it to 
collect and use minor’s personal and sensitive information from Plaintiff.   
65. Each instance of Google’s nonconsensual and unauthorized collection and use of Plaintiff’s and  
personal information in one or more ways described above constitutes a separate violation of 
COPPA and is thus a separate violation of the UCL’s “unlawful” prong.  
66. Pursuant to Section 1303(c) of COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c), a violation of COPPA constitutes an 
“unfair” or “deceptive” act or practice in or affecting commerce, in violation of the FTC Act and 
thus the UCL. 
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67. Parents of MK and MK have no control over how Google uses the data it collects and how that data 
may be used in a predictive manner.  The potential of harm for children who are unaware and lack 
the foresight to understand that data is being collected and to protect themselves against the long 
term consequences of their childish online behavior is grave.  The harm outweighs any benefit.  
Google has no educational purpose for collecting and storing biometric and behavioral data and 
student’s communications.  Google does have a business purpose it can create dossiers to future 
employers, advertisers and anyone willing to purchase the history of a child to monitor their life’s 
progression.
68. Unfair acts under the UCL have been interpreted using three different tests:  
(1) whether the public policy which is a predicate to a consumer unfair competition action under 
the unfair prong of the UCL is tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
provisions; (2) whether the gravity of the harm to the consumer caused by the challenged business 
practice outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct; and (3) whether the consumer injury is 
substantial, not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and is an 
injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. Defendants’ conduct is unfair 
under each of these tests.  
69. Google’s conduct violates the policies underlying privacy law, as well as COPPA itself.   
70. Plaintiff and his parents were completely unaware of Google’s practices as alleged herein, they 
could not possibly have avoided the privacy-based harms such practices caused.  Google’s 
violations of the UCL were, and are, willfully unlawful, deceptive, and unfair.  
71. Google is aware of its violative conduct, yet has failed to adequately and affirmatively take steps to 
cure such misconduct. In fact Google signed a Student Privacy Pledge and mislead parents into 
believing Google would only use data for authorized school and educational purposes and inform 
parents of the types of student personal information Google collects, if any, and the purposes for 
which the information Google maintains is used or shared with third parties.   
72.  MK was directly and proximately harmed by Google’s violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§17200.  
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73. Plaintiff MK seeks injunctive relief requiring Google and the District to delete such “biometric 
identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other personally identifiable information already 
collected without parental consent, and to implement functionality sufficient to prevent the 
unlawful collection of such “biometric identifiers,” “biometric information,” and other personally 
identifiable information in the future; notify parent of who and what entities received student’s data 
and (2) reasonable attorney’s fees (pursuant to Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1021.5).  
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
Against All Defendants
74. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1- 65 as if fully set forth herein.
75. Fremont Unified School District was negligent when it allowed Google LLC to obtain biometric 
and personal information on student in violation of state and federal laws. 
76. Fremont Unified School District was negligent when it required students to submit to Google’s 
platforms to obtain educational services during Covid-Related shutdowns.
77. Fremont Unified School District and Google were negligent when it failed to train its teachers on 
the risk of hackers and predators infiltrating the online platform and how to respond and identify 
individuals who hacked into the online class programs and protect student safety.
78. Google purposefully misrepresented and obfuscated its COPPA- violative conduct, which in turn 
resulted in MK being forced to use Google’s service in order to participate in school. Google has 
complete control over the data collection, use, and retention practices of its services, including the 
biometric data and other personally identifying information collected through the use of the 
service, and uses this control not only to secretly and unlawfully monitor and profile children, but 
to do so without the knowledge or consent of those children’s parents. Such exploitation by 
Google, with its unique knowledge of its wrongful practices, occurred to the detriment of MK, his 
family and has invaded the privacy of Plaintiffs as well as causing him to have his account 
infiltrated with inappropriate language of a hacker. 
79. The District failed to offer reasonable care to ensure MK would not be subjected to the invasion of 
his privacy and data collection of Google to access his education. 
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80. The District was in a position to warn parents and protect student MK from the data collection but 
failed to protect MK for some unknown reason. 
81. As a result of the District’s failures, Google has collected and upon information and belief still 
retains data on MK, that he is unable to have deleted and has resulted in his data collection having 
false behavioral data linked to him.
82. The District and Google LLC had a duty to protect MK from predators while he was participating 
in his online school.  Google assumed this responsibility when it made entered schools for the 
purpose of data collection.  Fremont Unified duty to MK exists as it was the provider of education 
services during the time the event occurred. 
83. Parents allege a hacker was able to use MK’s Google account to make inappropriate comments to 
MK’s teacher during class.
84. MK was harmed when he was punished and excluded from school and when the District failed to 
identify the source and IP address of the inappropriate comments. MK was harmed from the 
exclusions from his online class during a pandemic that had excluded him from in person learning. 
MK also suffered harm to his reputation.  
85. The District and Google breached its duty to protect student while he was participating in school 
and each defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing MK’s harm. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of the California Constitutional Right to Privacy 
86. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations in paragraphs 1- 65 as if fully set forth herein.
87. Plaintiff has a reasonable expectations of privacy in his mobile devices and his online behavior, 
generally. 
88. The reasonableness of such expectations of privacy is supported by Defendant Google and 
District’s unique position to monitor Plaintiff’s behavior through their access to Plaintiff’s privately 
owned personal computer and his Chrome Book during non school hours.  It is further supported 
by the surreptitious, highly-technical, and non-intuitive nature of Defendant Google’s tracking.
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89. Defendants intentionally intruded on and into Plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs by 
intentionally designing the App to secretly obtain, and improperly gain knowledge of, review, and 
or retain Plaintiff’s activities through the technologies and activities described herein.
90. These intrusions are highly offensive to a reasonable person. This is evidenced by, inter alia, the 
legislation enacted by Congress, rules promulgated by the FTC. the extent of the intrusion cannot 
be fully known, as the nature of privacy invasion involves sharing Plaintiff’s  personally 
identifiable information and/or viewing data with potentially countless third-parties, known and 
unknown, for undisclosed and potentially unknowable purposes, in perpetuity. Also supporting the 
highly offensive nature of Defendant Google’s conduct is the fact that Defendant Google’s 
principal goal was to surreptitiously monitor Plaintiff in one of the most private spaces available to 
an individual in modern life-and to allow third-parties to do the same. Google used the chaos 
surrounding Covid shut downs to gain access into the homes, behaviors, habits and biometrics of 
student and such behavior is extremely outrageous.
91. Plaintiff was harmed by the intrusion into their private affairs as detailed throughout this 
Complaint.
92. Defendant Google’s actions and conduct complained of herein were a substantial factor in causing 
the harm suffered by Plaintiff.
93. As a result of Defendant Google’s actions, Plaintiffs seek nominal and punitive damages in an 
amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages because Defendant Google’s 
actions which were malicious, oppressive, willful were calculated to injure Plaintiffs and made in 
conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. Punitive damages are warranted to deter Defendants from 
engaging in future misconduct.  
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
       
94. Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendants as follows:  
A.  Find that Defendants actions, as described herein, constitute (i) a violation of the Video 
Privacy Protection Act; (ii) a violation of SOPIPA; (iii) a violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
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§ 17200; (iv) were a Failure to Protect ; (v) California Constitutional Right to Privacy, Article 
I, Section 1 
B.  Declaring that District must offer an alternative to students who wish to maintain their 
privacy and do not wish to submit to Google’s platforms;  
C.   Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of 
Plaintiffs, an order requiring Google to permanently destroy the biometric identifiers and 
biometric information it has collected from Plaintiff;   
D. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages because Google’s actions were oppressive and willful. 
Punitive damages are warranted to deter this misconduct in the future; 
E.  Damages for emotional distress and damage to reputation caused by negligence of 
Defendants;   
F.  Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to the California UCL as is necessary 
to protect the interests of Plaintiff;  
G.  Awarding Plaintiffs’ counsel their reasonable litigation expenses, expert fees, and attorneys’ 
fees;
H.   An award of other and further relief as equity and justice may require.  
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all claims in this Complaint so triable. Plaintiff also 
respectfully request leave to amend this Complaint to conform to the evidence, if such amendment 
is needed for trial.  
Dated:  October 29, 2021. 
By:
Nicole Hodge Amey 
Law Offices of Nicole Hodge Amey  
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 5100 
Oakland, California  94605 
Telephone:  (510) 479-0003 
Facsimile:  (866) 602-2986  
Email: nicole.amey@lonhaca.com
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